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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/07/2011 Accident number: 762 
Accident time: Not recorded Accident Date: 05/05/2007 
Where it occurred: CBU 829, Area 2 Ayta 
Ash Shaab town 
Country: Lebanon 
Primary cause: Inadequate survey (?) Secondary cause: Other (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 09/05/2007 
ID original source: BOI 005/07 Name of source: UN MACC SL 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: MZD-2 submunition Ground condition: rocks/stones 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 15/07/2011 
No of victims: 0 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: UTM 719524-664828 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate survey (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
non injurious accident (?) 
 
Accident report 
The report of this incident was made available by the UN MACC in 2008. Its conversion into a 
DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost.  Text in square brackets [ ] is 
editorial. The report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
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File Reference: BOI 005/07 
BAC  INCIDENT REPORT 009/2007 
INVESTIGATION REPORT ON A MZD 2 SUB-MUNITTION AT CBU 829, Area 2 Ayta Ash 
Shaab on the 5th May 2007 
The Incident occurred in Area 2 (CBU 829), UTM 719524-664828 on the 5th May 2007, on a 
Completed Site where one MZD 2 Sub-Munition was located when an access road was being 
constructed. 
References: 
• Lebanon National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs) 
• International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 
• [Demining group] Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) 
• [Demining group] Completion Report CBU 829  
 
Introduction 
1. In accordance with the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs), the MACC 
SL Programme Manager, Mr. [Name removed] and Lt.Col [Name removed], NDO 
Representative, issued a Verbal Convening Order on Friday the 7th May 2007, for an incident 
investigation independent inquiry.  The MACC SL board members are Capt [Name removed] 
LAF Operations Officer Areas 1-5, MACC SL and [Name removed], Chief of QA MACC SL. 
2. This is a comprehensive report by the investigation board into the BAC Incident that 
occurred on the 5th May 2007 which is based on the MACC SL investigation, the [Demining 
group] completion report: 
 
Date: 5th May 2007. Time of Incident: not known. 
Location: Ayta Ash Shaab, Area 2, Lebanon, Task: CBU-829 
UTM of location of the munition: 719524-664828 
Task Start / Finish Date: 8th November to 19th December 2006 
Reported by: MACC, SL, CLO [Name removed]. 
Reported to: Operations Department, MACC SL 
Time of Incident report to MACC QA: N/A 
MA Organisation POC: [Name removed], PM [Demining group] 
Investigation Date/Time: 7th May 2007 14000hrs  
Investigation Location: Task Dossier 2-007, CBU - 829 
Investigation Team: Capt [Name removed], LAF Operations Officer, Areas 1-5 and [Name 
removed], MACC SL C of QA Officer. 
Explosive Ordnance Type: MZD 2 Submunition  
 
Background 
4. CBU 829  forms a part of 3 CBUs in task Dossier 2-007 issued to [Demining group]  for 
clearance as part of the sub-munitions clearance programme in SL. CBU 829 was completed 
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on the 13 April 2007, see annex A for the [Demining group] Completion Report for CBUs 
829,830 and 604. According to the [Demining group] file for the task was a combination of 
surface and sub-surface clearance in accordance the TSGs and the operational clearance 
plan, with a position left uncleared due to the unusable nature of the land. This area is likely to 
contain additional MZD 2s. A combined total of 81,300m2 was cleared, of which 39,500m2 
was sub-surface cleared. A total of 181 MZD 2 were located and destroyed during clearance..     
Events leading up to the Incident 
6.  The land owner, [Name removed], immediately contacted the CLO area 1-5 on the 5th 
May 2007 to report the location and the events surrounding the incident. This site was visited 
by MACC SL Operations, QA and the CLO to conduct an investigation of the event 
surrounding the discovery of the sub-munitions.  
 
The accident site 
BOI Post Incident Activities and General Observations 
7. On arrival at the incident site, it was ascertained that they could gain safe access up to the 
incident site without additional clearance being conducted. During the visit on the 7th May 07 
it was possible to clearly view the location of the MZD 2. 
8. On the inspection of the incident site on the 7th May 2007 the following general 
observations were established: 
• The land area in which the MZD 2 was located had been developed to allow the 
construction of an access road.  




The MZ-2 submunition in-situ 
 
Geography and Weather 
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9. CBU 829 is located, with the nearest Town being Ayta Ash Shaab. The land is primarily is 
used for agriculture, but some construction is being undertaken on the site.  
Conclusions 
10.  Based on the investigation, the documentation and visit to the site, the investigation 
concludes the following: 
• CBU 829  was previously surface cleared as part of a task dossier 2-007, and 
included CBUs 830 and 604, issued by the MACC SL to [Demining group]. 
• The location of the submunitions was identified as  in an area that clearance had 
taken place.      
• The MZD 2 was located at ground level, was in good condition, free of dirt and no 
damage was seen (see attached photos). 
• An un-cleared area remains which may have MZD 2 located inside. 
• The land owner wished to have the un-cleared area searched. 
• It is unlikely that the MZD 2 sub-munitions would have been positioned in the location 
with little damage, free of spoil and completely above or on the surface given the 
amount of earthworks that was undertaken in the immediate and exact location of the 
MZD 2. 
Recommendations 
11. The following are recommendations based on the BOI conclusions: 
• CLOs to continue to warn local residence of areas have been cleared and the 
remaining un-cleared areas present a continued danger.  
• Appropriate warning signs are erected in areas where a there are un-cleared areas. 
• Identify the un-cleared areas for future clearance priorities. 
 
Signed: [Name removed], C/QA Officer, MACC SL, [Name removed], LAF Operations Officer, 
Area 1-5, NDO/MACC SL  
9th May 2007 
Comments by the MACC SL Chief of QA 
[None] 
[Name removed], UN Chief QA, MACC SL 
 
Comments by the MACC SL Chief of Operations 
[None] 
[Name removed], UN Chief of Operations, MACC SL 
Seen/Agreed  
[Name removed], UN Programme Manager, MACC SL 
Seen/Agreed  
[Name removed], NDO Representative, MACC SL  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this Missed mine/device incident is listed as Inadequate survey because 
the area had been subjected to a surface search when it should have been sub-surface 
searched. The decision to conduct superficial surface search in areas where agricultural and 
construction activity would take place was the responsibility of the MACC SL, the same body 
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that investigated the incident, so no independent investigation was made. The secondary 
cause is listed as Other  because it is possible that the submunition was placed later. 
The visual search of an area where devices may be below the ground surface is not 
“clearance” as defined in the IMAS and increases the risk of civilian injury because it 
encourages them to think that the area is safe to use. 
It is noteworthy that the MACC SL BOI team “ascertained that they could gain safe access to 
the incident site without additional clearance being conducted”, then entered the area without 
PPE (photographs show this) and without searching for submunitions that may have been 
close enough to the surface to have been disturbed by footfalls. This might be considered 
irresponsible and unprofessional.  
The Inadequate investigation referenced under Notes is included because the investigator’s 
conclusions are anything but conclusive. They imply that the device may have been placed 
where it was found. They do not seem to consider that it may have been missed during a 
visual search, or may have rolled into position during earth moving in the area. 
The Inadequate equipment referenced under Notes refers to the lack of a means of searching 
sub-surface (metal-detector). No criticism of the commercial demining group is implied – it 
was apparently carrying out the task as directed by the UN supported MACC. 
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